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1 Introduction
After its foundation in 1998 online poker evolved to a multi-billion dollar industry
leading to thousands of games played every day worldwide. At its peak in 2009
the revenue of the online poker industry was estimated to be over 2.4 billion dollars
(c.f.[8]).
The obvious incentive to win money usually leads players to choose the best strategy
they are capable of in order to maximize profit. This makes players’ behaviour an
interesting topic to analyse, as a strategy which reduces profits can be considered
to be irrational. Furthermore, a great amount of data about online poker games is
easy to acquire due to the vast amount of games played every day.
Consequently, a lot of research was conducted about online poker within different
fields of science, as it is interesting concerning players’ behaviour and statistical anal-
ysis is possible due to extremely much data available. Research concerning poker
can be divided into three major groups. One: poker is used for computer science to
research the topic of artificial intelligence, two: it is examined whether it should be
categorized as a game of skill or not and three: the social and psychological aspect,
especially focusing on gambling addiction.
The first ever published article about poker was written in 1995 before the founda-
tion of online poker, taking first steps to create a programm to solve Texas Hold’em
poker using artificial intelligence (c.f.[6]). After this first approach the University
of Alberta founded the computer poker research group in which poker is examined
for artificial intelligence, first theoretically and afterwards using online poker data.
Modelling opponents (c.f.[23]) and dealing with imperfect information (c.f.[27]) was
researched broadly, before in 2016 the first superior poker programm was created,
solving heads up limit Texas Hold’em poker (c.f.[7]). This is considered to be a
breakthrough concerning the topic of artificial intelligence and machine learning.
Online poker was restricted in the USA and several other countries on the so called
“Black Friday” in 2011 due to legal components of online gambling(c.f.[8]). This
rose the question whether poker is a skill game or not, leading to a lot of research
and publications, since all legal restrictions only apply to gambling games not to
those relying on skill (c.f.[15],[22],[18]). All articles considered poker to rely at least
partly on skill. [18] concluded strong evidence that poker is a game of skill within
his research. Such publications lead online poker to recover again to some extent
because restrictions were less and less enforced.
Further, there is a lot of research conducted about social and psychological as-
pects of online poker, mainly focussing on pathological behaviour and gambling
addiction(c.f.[4],[19],[24]). Results established online poker to be a threat for many
people involved. The so called tilting, meaning to loose control over the decision
taking process because of emotions, can be observed as a common feature in online
poker. The influence of emotions and psychological aspects on strategy and rational
behaviour is stressed within of this research.
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To the best of our knowledge the development of poker over the past years and
the behaviour of poker players when being pressured by an opponent have not been
researched yet. These two topics contribute to previous research as an improvement
in strategy would suggest the game to rather depend on skill than on chance. Fur-
thermore, the reaction towards pressure highlights psychological aspects of the game
which, to some extent, might be generalizable to different fields of human behaviour.
The rise of various poker schools like pokerstrategy.com or twoplustwo.com should
have increased the level of skill involved in online poker and changed the way poker
is played to some extent. The number of members on pokerstrategy.com increased
from 1.8 million in 2008 to over 7 million members in 2015. As a consequenze, the
website became by far the largest poker community (c.f.[3]).
To conduct this research we examine the pre-flop game, hence the first round of
betting with each player only holding two cards. This is very suitable as it is simple
concerning players choices, but still contains all the interesting features of betting,
strategy and pressure.
In this thesis we will conduct statistical analysis with two datasets, one from 2009,
the other from 2015 in order to examine differences and improvement of strategy
over the years, which might be caused by the rise of poker schools. We will analyse
how online pre-flop poker has changed the past six years by first providing a descrip-
tive analysis of the decisions taken and later focus on the reaction under pressure.
Pressure is hereby defined as the least amount of money a player is forced to bet (by
an opponent) in order to stay in the game. Additionally, we will examine if strategic
improvement can be observed over the years, which would contribute a reason for
poker to rather be skill game.
Possible reasons for a change in poker players’ pre-flop behaviour are restrictions
to play online poker in the US (c.f[8]) and the use of tutorials and literature, being
now more available(c.f.[1]).
We will examine in more detail how players react when being put under pressure
pre-flop and to what extent this leads to irrational behaviour. There will be several
explanatory approaches provided, for certain strategical patterns of players if being
pressured.
This thesis will show how the pre-flop game has changed the past years by us-
ing previous research conducted and statistical analysis of two datasets each from a
different year.
2 The Pre-Flop Game - Overview
As mentioned, this thesis will only focus on the first round played in Texas Hold’em
poker games, also referred to as the pre-flop game.
There are no common cards dealt yet which would have to be considered for post
flop analysis, thus pre-flop analysis is easier to understand and more clearly con-
cerning strategical patterns.
According to the biggest online poker strategy web site the pre-flop game is crucial
for any poker player, thus we can expect players to put a lot of thought into their
decisions (c.f.[1]).
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The pre-flop game starts with the two players sitting behind the player in ”but-
ton” position. Both have to contribute a mandatory size of money to the pot before
seeing their cards - the first player behind the button, the so called small blind, the
next one the big blind, usually double the size of the small blind. Afterwards, every
player is dealt two cards face down, which the players are allowed to see.
Later, there are several rounds of betting starting with the player sitting behind the
big blind and further on moving clockwise, in which every player - depending on the
previous actions of their opponents - has the option to check, call, raise or fold.
While checking (staying in the game without contributing any further money) is
only possible if the necessary amount of money is already contributed to the pot,
which in our case is only possible for the big blind position if no one before him
decided to raise, the other three options deal with a difference between the amount
of money the player has already committed to the pot and the amount necessary
to proceed in the game. Folding means quitting that round while calling means
putting the minimum amount of money forward that is necessary in order to stay in
the game. To bet even more than the minimum necessary is called raising and puts
pressure on any other player still participating in this round of the game, as all the
other players have to adjust afterwards to this amount to stay in the game.
The flop is dealt as soon as potential raises are called by at least one other player.
The game is won if a raise is not called by any other player, hence the flop does not
have to be dealt.
Afterwards, there are several rounds of betting and common cards shown, which is
called the post-flop game but this will not be examined within this thesis.
As soon as one player’s raise is not called or all common cards are dealt resulting
in a showdown, the player holding the best combination of cards wins, the round
ends, the button moves one position clockwise, the blinds are put forward and new
pocket cards are dealt (c.f.[5]).
Overall, there are three parts of analysis within this thesis, two descriptive ones
and one using statistical inference and multi-layer modelling.
First, there is a broad overview provided on pre-flop decisions within the years of
2009 and 2015. Afterwards, the percentage of players reaching the flop separated
by year, the number of players at each table, the size of the blind and the positions
is demonstrated within a bar chart. These two steps should introduce the reader to
the pre-flop decisions and give a general overview of the pre flop game itself.
The following analysis focuses on the influence of pressure on the probability for a
player to reach the flop, within the two different years. The pressure is the minimum
amount of money a certain player has to contribute to the pot to further proceed in
the game. Explanatory approaches of several kinds are delivered afterwards.
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3 Sampling Theory and Variables Examined
All the data used is acquired from the online poker tracking site hhsmithy.com.
The kind of poker analysed is Texas Hold’em no limit, in which raises are only lim-
ited by the size of the players’ total amount of money involved in the game, also
referred to as the stack. All players are able to bet the entire money they are en-
rolled with as long as they have not folded already.
This way of playing poker is more risky and popular than Hold’em limited within
the online poker community, even though risks are less calculable and severe losses
are possible within one hand. Psychologically speaking, this makes the game more
exciting hence more popular especially to gambling addicts.
The data only contains games with three to six players at each table, which are also
referred to as short-handed tables and are the most common ones.
We chose to analyse games being played at NL100 and NL200, which imply 0.5-1$
and 1-2$ blinds for each game and buy ins of 100$ or 200$.
These limits are played very frequently. NL100 and NL200 is played mostly by ad-
vanced or intermediate players thus only few professional players and beginners are
found on such limits.
The level of skill naturally rises with the size of the big blind as people who strive
to win more money try to play on higher limits. The analysis benefits from the fact
that very few beginners or ”rookies” are involved in these limits who might provide
difficulties because of randomness throughout their strategies (c.f.[26]).
With these limits we can expect players to have a big incentive to win and thus
will play most of the time as accurately as they are capable of. Consequently, they
provide good data for analysing the development of poker strategy throughout the
years.
This separation by blinds offers the opportunity to examine two slightly different
groups of poker players, as one group has twice as much money involved than the
other.
Overall, there are datasets for two different years used, each containing about 15
million hands played, which are themselves divided into two subsets each of the size
of about 7.5 million hands representing the two limits, mentioned above, they are
played on.
One set contains data of hands played before the black Friday of poker in July 2009,
the other, more recent data, starting in July 2015.
Both datasets are tracked from major poker sites used all around the globe.1
This leads to a dataset containing about 30 million hands played. Such a great
sample is very bias resistant and ensures statistical significance throughout most
models, thus enabling generalization to some extent.
There are fewer hands available from tables with less players involved because a lot
of players prefer tables with five or six players. Overall, nearly 60% of hands anal-
ysed are played at a six players table, 31% at tables with five people leaving fewer
hands for the other two. Unfortunately, this makes analysis with data containing
fewer players at a table more bias prone.
1Full Tilt Poker, Party Poker, Poker Stars
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In the year of 2009 before ”Black Friday” more people played poker online than
in 2015, hence the data from the year of 2015 is played during a longer period of
time.
For each player there are several variables examined.
The pre-flop decisions are separated in rounds of betting, which always provide the
action taken each turn of a certain player. The most turns one player has during
the pre-flop game are three, hence there are three variables representing each turn
for every player.
Further, there is a variable showing whether the player reaches the flop, so if he
folded during one of his turns or not. Winning the round within the pre-flop game
is also considered as reaching the flop.
One further binary variable provides the year the game was played in and another
one the size of the big blind. Additionally, the number of players at each table is
given in form of a variable.
Furthermore, the pressure for any player is provided for each possible round of bet-
ting, leading to another three variables. This variable states the minimum amount
a player has to contribute to the pot to stay in the game measured in big blinds,
thus quantifying to some extent the previous actions taken of their opponents.
The position at the table is also provided within a variable.
There are at most six different positions at a table which are sitting clockwise. The
button (BU), the small blind (SB), the big blind (BB), the middle position one
(MP1), the middle position two (MP2)and finally the cut-off (CO). If there are
fewer than six players the late positions do not exist leading to a table with only
button, small and big blind at a table with three players. All these positions imply
strategic aspects which will be discussed in chapter four.
Overall, there are ten variables examined and analysed for one player.
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4 Pre-Flop Actions - A Decision Tree
Figure 1: Decision Tree
A general overview of pre-flop decisions, decision-combinations and their fre-
quencies is provided within this chapter.
The decision tree provides a visualisation of players’ decision in every round of bet-
ting depending on their previous choices.
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A tree is shown for the years of 2009 and 2015.
As soon as all raises are called or the game is won, the pre-flop game is finished in
that particular round and there is no need for another round of betting.
The probabilities inside the decision tree refer to the rounded percentage with which
one player takes the given option. All probabilities add up to 100%.
In either year, the first level of the tree is the most important one, as nearly all
pre-flop games are decided within this first round of betting. For the year of 2009
94.6% of the games did not have a second round of pre-flop betting while in 2015
94.7% did not.
Within the second round of betting over 99.9% of the pre-flop games are decided in
both years, making observation of the third round of betting not necessary due to
the size of the data affected.
If checked or folded during the first round there is no need for a second round of
betting for this particular player. As only the big blind position can check if all the
previous players either folded or called, he automatically reaches the flop by calling.
By definition, folding ends the game for the player.
For a second round of betting there has to be at least one call challenged with a
raise or one re-raise. Subsequently, for a third round of betting there has to be at
least one further re-raise, which is vey rare and, most of the time, leads to all-in
pushes. (c.f.[5]).
Overall, the percentage of each pre-flop choice is a good indicator to see whether
strategy has changed within the years, thus directly refers to the thesis about im-
provement over the years.
According to [24] a more aggressive style of play improves chances for a positive
payout. Thus we could expect players from 2015 to pressurize opponents more
frequently and severely. Concerning poker strategy, counter intuitively folding is
considered to be more aggressive than calling, because weak calls are usually not
practicable to be played aggressively.
The most common and recommended strategy seen on online tutoring sites is the
tight-aggressive style, which implies only to play few starting hands, but those
aggressively(c.f.[1]). In consequence of this strategy, one would expect to see more
raising and folding and less calling for the year of 2015 compared to 2009 in the
decision tree provided.
For the first round of betting 15.7% of players in 2009 and 18.8% of players in
2015 decided to raise. The difference of 3.1% might not seem tremendous, but it is
both significant according to significance tests (P-value beneath computer accuracy
within chi-square and exact binomial test) and has a severe impact on the pre-flop
game itself. In other words, the amount of raises the first round of betting has such
a great impact on any player, that even slight changes severely affect the game.
Furthermore, twice as many people checked in 2009 (3.1%) than in 2015, suggesting
that more players in big blind position were not pressured at all in 2009. Hence the
aggression level should be beneath the one in 2015.
Overall, fewer players folded in 2015 with 64.9% than in 2009 with 69.3%.
This does not hold with the theory of the game improving over the years, as litera-
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ture suggests to fold frequently(c.f.[24]).
The ratio of players calling is relatively equal within the years, with 12.0% in 2009
and 11.3% in 2015.
According to an exact binomial test, examining if the differences between the two
years are significant, all the differences for each decision taken the first round are
significant with P-values beneath computer accuracy. Hence the values are signifi-
cantly different beyond any doubt. This can be traced back to the big number of
observations, in which even 12.0% to 11.3% is significantly different.
Figure 2: Bar Chart - First Round of Betting
Figure 2 visualizes the differences of the first round of betting pre-flop, showing
how the strength of cards with which a certain option is taken differs in the years.
We can conclude from more raises made in 2015 that they have to be made with
on average weaker hands than in 2009, because raises are made with on average
stronger hands than calls, which themselves are usually made with stronger hands
than folds. We can further conclude that players called with worse hands the first
round in 2015, due to more folding in 2009. This leads to the strength of the pocket
cards with which was called in 2015 ranging from the 72.5 to 84.4 % of starting
hands arranged according to their strength and from 64.3 to 80.5 % in 2015.
All in all, the first most important round of betting suggests a major difference
between the years.
These numbers only live partly up to the expectations. We can conclude that ac-
tions have become more aggressive as people decided to raise with weaker hands.
(If raised more weaker hands have to be involved.) On the other hand fewer people
folded in the year of 2015, leading to calls with weaker hands than in 2009. The
difference between the years is quite high, the first round of betting suggesting a
change of strategy over the years.
The second round of betting is, as explained above, only possible for a players
who has called or raised the first round and whose hand is questioned by another
raise.
This was the case for 5.4% of players in 2009 and 5.3% of the players in 2015.
Although only few player reach the second round due to those reasons, it is very
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interesting to examine, as the second round delivers insights into strategical aspects
and the players’ reaction towards pressure. Players reaching the second round of
betting have already contributed money to the pot, increasing the overall probabil-
ity to stay in the game, as they want to protect their investment.
Starting with the options after a call first round 43.2% of players in 2009 decided to
fold, facing the second round while in 2015 only 38.8% did. Consequently, in 2009
more people did not consider their hand to be strong enough as they were challenged
to continue in the game.
Even though the hands with which was called in 2015 were as established before
weaker, more players decided to keep on playing their hands when being raised.
This suggests that players tend to play their hands more aggressively as soon as
they decide to stay in the game first round in 2015, leading to higher risks. It is
dubious if such a strategy is better.
There are 3.0% of re-raises in 2015 and 2.8% in 2009, signalising a very strong hand
or attempt to bully a raise out of the game. Thus again, there was more aggression
in 2015. The scenario of a re-raise after a first round call rarely occurs, as calling
first round does usually not suggest a very strong hand. Even though players in 2015
used wore cards for calling first round, there were slightly more re-raises within the
second round than in 2009.
The method of re-raising when the first round call is challenged seems very odd. If
the cards were not strong enough for a first round raise, they are usually not strong
enough for a very risky second round re-raise. The strategy would only make sense
if a player is holding one of the best possible hands and is willing to wait for the flop,
to get paid more compared to a situation in which everyone else folds to a pre-flop
raise. This strategy is very risky and usually not recommended. The re-raise would
further make sense if a player is certain another player wants to bluff him out of the
pot.
Consequently, there were fewer calls in 2009 (54.0%) than in 2015 (58.2%), again
proposing a more aggressive style of strategy in 2015.
The options after a first round raise differ from the ones after a first round call, as
a first round raise usually already suggests a very strong hand.
More players decided to(re-re)raise with 7.5% in 2015 and 6.6% in 2009. Once again,
the more aggressive choice was more common in 2015 than in 2009. Note that a
re-raise is more probable in 2015 although the average hand with which was initially
raised is on average weaker. This is no sign of irrational behaviour as the 7.5% of
the re-raised will most likely be those that are very strong indeed.
The major difference between the years can be seen within the other two options.
In 2009, only 38.5% folded while in 2015 51.7% did. A player would only fold against
a re-raise if he considers his opponent’s cards to be stronger than his own. This huge
difference suggests that people in 2015 raise with weaker hands in the first round
comparing the year of 2015 and 2009, making the game more aggressive.
There are several reasons which could explain this huge difference between the years,
one of which is the in [11] researched strategy of pre-flop blind stealing. Using this
strategy a player pressures the big and small blind, often in late position in order
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to bluff them out of the game and thus collecting the blinds. But if a player faces a
strong hand in small or big blind position he might get re-raised hence is forced to
fold.
The ratio of calls is consequently lower in 2015 (40.8%) than in 2009 (55.0%).
All the analysis of pre-flop decisions emphasises the differences between the two
years and even though there are mixed results concerning improvement over the
years, poker strategy has certainly changed over the years.
5 Probability to Reach the Flop - A Bar Chart
This second overview provides the probability of reaching the flop for any player
regarding several preconditions. The preconditions, hence variables the data is sep-
arated by are the size of the big blind, the year the game was played in, the number
of players at each table and finally the position of each player.
Figure 4 takes the first step to analyse the players’ decision making process, but is
only regarding the categorical variables mentioned above. The chance to reach the
flop for one certain player is the most important variable for the rest of the analysis,
because with this variable a huge variety of interesting features of the pre-flop game
can be seen. After all, a player cannot win, if he does not reach the flop. It has
to be mentioned that the target variable is binary and thus chances are calculated
by the mean of the variable over all players affected. Such procedures are originally
bias prone, but the extreme high number of observations makes individual variance
nearly irrelevant. This approach holds the basic information about pre-flop decisions
considering all categorical variables used.
The main subject of this chart is to provide some insight into important pre-flop
conditions and to show the probabilities themselves. The overview also helps to
understand more thorough analysis in chapter 6 and makes comparison of the two
years and the interaction of the year with all other variables possible. All the influ-
ences of these variables will be interpreted in depth. Further, the years influence on
all the other variables will later be examined. Thus, we will see more precisely how
big the influence of the variable year is.
The chart provides all interactions between the variables but only the interaction of
the year with the other ones is interpreted. It has to be mentioned that the number
of observations differs severely between the categories observed. The table provided
beneath the chart shows how many observations the analysis was conducted with in
every category.
First, we start with the number of players at each table which, according to
pokerstrategy.com ([1]), completely changes the pre-flop game. Concerning tactics,
strong hands will try to eliminate weak hands within the pre-flop game (to avoid to
lose to a lucky hit on the flop)(c.f.[2]). Thus, more people sitting at a table should
decrease the chance to reach the flop for the individual. Further, a table with fewer
players has a higher percentage of players contributing a blind, which players would
like to protect by at least calling.
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Figure 3: Bar Chart - Overview of the Influence of all Categorical Variables
Table 1: Number of Observations for each Segment










Results within the data and bar chart meet the expectations. The probability to
reach the flop decreases from 45.9% at a table with three players to 27.8% at a table
with six players.
This influence, even though its huge impact, is not interesting for our strategical
analysis, as it could be argued that a different number of players at a table changes
the game completely and thus different numbers of players at a table would have to
be examined separately.
Secondly, we take a look at the influence of the blind’s size. According to vari-
ous research the increase of the blind evokes a skill-increase of the players involved
(c.f.[24][14]).
This is also used as an argument to stress the importance of skill in the game(c.f.[16]).
As it can be argued, if the increase of a blind increases the skill level as well, skill
overall plays a very important role in the game and even might be quantifiable. If
poker was a pure game of luck there should be no difference.
Looking at the data the probability to reach the flop declines from 30.1% to 28.7%
with an increase of the blind.
There is no generalizable opinion about the percentage which a player should reach
the flop with, because sources differ on this aspect by promoting different styles
of poker strategy such as loose aggressive (reaching the flop frequently) or tight-
aggressive. Thus, skill related conclusions can not be drawn easily.
One could argue that slightly less people reaching the flop hints towards more ag-
gressive play, but whether the level of skill actually improved can not be concluded
without doubt.
The at most six different positions at a short handed poker table all have differ-
ent tactical implications. General opinion promoted within strategical websites is
that positions improve the later it is their turn to move the first round, with the
exception of the two blinds, as they already have to commit money to the pot before
seeing their cards (c.f.[1]). One reason for the improvement of later positions is that
those positions already gained information about their opponents, whose turn it was
before them and thus have lower risks to be raised by a strong hand sitting behind
them.
The percentage of players reaching the flop in the two positions posting a blind
provides information about the aggression of the players before them, as already
mentioned in chapter 4. Because the more aggressive the game gets the more pres-
sure lies upon those two late positions, thus increasing their probability to fold.
The data does not confirm this assumption as expected.
As easily recognizable due to the order of positions within the bar chart, the earlier
positions are not always less likely to reach the flop.
Furthermore, there are generally just a few differences between the values (for six
players it ranges from 28.5% of the BB to 27.5% of the MP1 and even only 27.1%
of the BU).
Consequently, the influence of the position is not considered by the players of both
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years to be as important as literature suggests. Different positions do not influence
the probability to reach the flop as expected. Either players do not act according to
the strategy suggested by literature, or reaching the flop is just not very dependent
on the position but rather on other variables.
Now for the years there is some difference expected. As this thesis examines whether
the game has changed over the years we should expect difference. According to the
information provided in chapter 4 one might expect the number of players reaching
the flop to be smaller in the year of 2015 due to the more aggressive style of the game.
Looking at the chart the opposite is the case. In 2015, 30.3% of all players reached
the flop while in 2009 only 28.5% did.
Even though this result was not expected it does not automatically conclude any-
thing about the skill of the players involved. Because as mentioned, it is not clear
whether a high percentage of players reaching the flop means a decline in skill.
The difference between the years is overall quite high. The combination of more
raises while more people reach the flop does not seem to make any sense but there
are some possible explanations. It hints towards a difference between the approach
of dealing with pressure within the years, because even though more players are
pressurized within the dataset of 2015 more players reach the flop.
Further, we will take a look at the interactions between the year and the other
three variables. We might expect the influences of the other three variables to be
bigger and more diverse in 2015, because the game should have developed to be
more analytical and consequently all factors should be given a bigger importance.
But the real data varies vastly due to strategic reasons, as some influences might
not be considered as important as well in 2015. Consequently, it is not easy to
predict or expect anything from these interactions, but one can definitively draw
some conclusions with the results.
As mentioned before the number of players has a big influence and now we will
examine in which year the influence is even more important.
According to the data, the number of players reaching the flop in 2015 ranges from
46.6% with three players at a table to 28.2% with six players at a table. The differ-
ence is bigger than the one of 2009 with 42.9% to 27.5%. Even though the differences
between the number of players is more important in 2015 it seems difficult to con-
clude anything about strategy but we could guess that people in 2009 are less aware
of the consequences of a different number of players at their table.
The influence of the blind’s size is bigger in 2015 as well. In 2009, there is nearly no
difference between the two blind levels (28.3 to 28.7%) while in 2015 more players
reach the flop at the lower blind level with 31.9% than on the higher one with 28.7%.
This suggests that the difference between those two groups has increased a bit over
the years. Versus 2009 this also hints towards more influence of the categorical vari-
14
ables in 2015.
Concerning the positions we examine the difference between the button, the small
and the big blind position as they are represented for each number of players at a
table.
The difference between the positions is bigger in 2009 (highest difference: 2.1%)
than in 2015 (1%). This shows that positions are taken more seriously in 2009 than
in 2015, which normally should be an indicator for better play. Consequently, this
contradicts the previous expectation of more awareness of categorical influences in
2015. According to [1] the position plays a big role in the pre-flop decision process.
This is not reflected in either subset concerning the probability to reach the flop.
In conclusion, the interactions only live up to the expectations to some extent.
But there can always a difference be found between the years suggesting that the
game has changed over the years. It can be argued that variance causes differences
between the two datasets, but the very high number of observations reduces this
factor to a dismissible minimum.
Overall, the data shows all variables examined to be of some importance for the
players. The influence varies between the years suggesting conclusions about the
improvement of strategy. Some expectations were not met in the analysis but the
overall trend seems to be as assumed. Thus, the data supports the idea of strategic
improvement over the years to some extent concerning the probability to reach the
flop. As now all the categorical variables available and their interactions are exam-
ined with regard to their influence towards the probability to reach the flop, we can
now go further and analyse the metric variable of pressure.
The reaction towards pressure is perhaps the most characteristic and interesting
part about poker and thus will thoroughly be examined.
Two major questions will be discussed. To what extent does pressure affect pre-flop
decisions and how does this influence differ over the years.
6 Behaviour under Pressure
This chapter examines players’ decision taking process when being pressurized the
first round of pre-flop betting, hence the change of the probability to reach the flop
under increasing pressure in both years. We expect the number of players reaching
the flop (hence deciding to call or re-raise) to decline with the amount of pressure
applied.
First, let us examine the evaluation of poker starting hands. Overall, the amount of
money raised the first round of betting should be highly correlated with the strength
of the hand.
There are 169 possible starting hands in poker. The evaluation of the strength of
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starting hands has been broadly discussed, resulting in a classification into several
groups (c.f.[1]). It has to be mentioned, that a common evaluation of starting hands
is difficult, due to the dependence on variables like position, strategy and number of
players involved, but there is a general opinion about the strength of each starting
hand. Poker strategy sources examined for this thesis only slightly differ in their
hand evaluation.
We can expect online poker players to roughly know how strong each starting hand
is, as it is both intuitive and broadly discussed within poker strategy literature. It is
very improbable that an online poker player starts a NL100 or NL200 game without
being aware of the strength of each starting hand.
This aspect of poker hand evaluation is important for further analysis because the
players usually base their pre-flop actions on the strength of their hand.
The starting hand has a substantial influence on the chance to win the game af-
ter common cards are dealt, even though there is some chance for weaker hands to
win. For example: The probability for two queens to win against a seven and a
two unsuited, with 88.9 %, is extremely high. Thus, poker players do not want to
commit too much money into the pot with hands they consider weaker than their
opponents’ and strive to get more money involved if they consider their hand to be
stronger. Chance might still lead to being two more sevens and another two in the
flop - but this is nothing one should bet on.
Now, let us examine possible reasons to raise pre-flop. As mentioned before there is
a difference in strength between starting hands, thus players want to benefit if being
dealt a good hand pre-flop. They can do so by raising, hence signalling a strong
hand and putting the other players under pressure. One further reason to raise
might be to gamble on other players having weak hands as well and thus winning
the blinds (the later the position the more common are such procedures)(c.f.[11]).
This is considered to be pre-flop bluffing and might be a good strategy in several
cases.
Overall, players’ pre-flop actions should depend on their, to some extent, subjec-
tive strength of hand, usually leading to high raises with strong hands and folds or
calls with weaker ones (c.f.[1]).
Because of this well known option to bluff in poker, meaning not to align the strength
of the hand with the action taken, the ratio of strength of the hand to the action
taken can not be approximated in a strictly linear way because players bluff due to
strategic aspects in order to maximise their winnings (c.f.[5]). Non the less, for the
following analysis we can expect players to have on average stronger hands when
raising than if they are folding or calling (c.f.[24]).
There is also a tactical implication in poker, in which people try to see the flop
cheap, in order to exploit cards that turn out to be winning regardless of their orig-
inal strength. This is called ”loose” play amongst poker players and is considered
to be weak by most poker books (c.f.[2]). This strategy can often be exploited by a
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tight-aggressive style of strategy, as there are no more cheap calls and committing
too much money with weak cards is considered to be a bad move.
All poker players strive for the advantage to win, thus no one will willingly face
an opponent holding worse cards, hence facing bad odds.
As we now established that raises often follow one out of the two motives, we can
look at the reactions towards pressure.
A player who has been raised faces one of three options (or conclusions due to the
opponents actions). One: He considers the opponents hand to be stronger than his
own and thus folds. Two: He beliefs that the opponents hand is strong, but con-
siders his own hand to be even better or at least equal hence re-raises or calls. And
three: He does not consider the opponent’s hand to be strong at all and decides to
re-raise or call regardless of his own hand.
This conclusion has to be drawn in a short period of time and often with lot a
of emotions involved.
After all, it breaks down to the evaluation of the own hand versus the opponent’s,
who has raised. A player is only aware of his own cards and must decide whether
he estimates the own hand to be better or at least equal and thus continues in the
game.
One further aspect which has to be mentioned is that if a player has already com-
mitted money in the pot he is more likely to continue in the game to protect his
investment (c.f.[5]). This is not as important in the pre-flop game as in the follow-
ing rounds, because only the small and big blind position have already contributed
money to the pot before the first round of betting. But it applies for a possible
second and third round of pre-flop betting.
6.1 Variable Preparation and Model Introduction
Every player has got to contribute at least the size of the big blind to the pot in
order to stay in the game, with the exceptions of the small and the big blind posi-
tion. Thus, nearly all players are, at any time, at least under the pressure of one big
blind. This amount of money is considered to be pressure as well, but as it applies
to any player it will be left out of the analysis. Consequently, there will be only
players observed who are pressurized above one big blind, hence who were raised.
Afterwards, we compare them to those not affected. This severely reduces the data
observed because many people fold without facing any pressure.
Because of this, the earliest position who is exclusively under the pressure of one
big blind the first round of betting, will drop out of the analysis almost completely.
As shown in chapter 4 only about 16% or 19% of players raise pre-flop depend-
ing on the year the game was played in. Thus, only some players who have been
raised, hence are under pressure, are used for the analysis of the reaction to pressure.
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For this paragraph we only examine the influence of the most important first round
of betting pre-flop. Because if a player faces a second or third round of betting he
has already committed money to the pot, which he does not want to lose. This
changes the influence of pressure, as he would loose money by not staying in the
game thus has an incentive to call even if he holds weaker hands than his opponent.
Players who haven’t committed any money don’t have any direct monetary loss by
folding.
Further, all raises above 25 big blinds will be analysed separately, because nearly
all pressure above 25 big blinds either leads to an all-in push or folding. Some of
these raises are all-in raises themselves by players with small stacks. Thus, there is
no severe difference between the pressure of 25 or a bigger one and only few data
is affected. The effect of higher raises than 25 big blinds will be shortly discussed
after the main analysis.
Furthermore, the pressure is rounded to one digit to provide clearer results and im-
prove illustration.
The two graphics provided, one for each year, show the percentage of players reach-
ing the flop depending on the first round pressure the player is under. Each dot
represents the percentage of players reaching the flop for a certain amount of pres-
sure applied. Hence we get 25 dots each year.
The blue line is a so called smoother or spline function, created with the ggplot2 r
package (c.f.[25]). This smoother delivers a multi-dimensional polynomial which ap-
proximates the influence as a function. The spline function delivers a clearer insight
into tendencies within the data and thus makes trends more easily recognizable.
Furthermore, the function also takes weighting into account, reacting to the amount
of players affected, thus resulting in a more accurate function (c.f.[12]).
The smoothing function also provides the variance of the estimation, which increases
with the size of the pressure and the fewer players there are at a table. It can be seen
as a grey area in figure 4 and 5. Overall, the variance is very low for our function
due to the big amount of data observed.
There is also a linear approximation provided within the figure, creating a lin-
ear regression over all the data provided using the maximum-likelihood estimation.
This illustrates the weighted, linear trend of the influence of pressure over all the
observations (c.f.[12]).
As there is only few data available for tables with three or four players thus the
uncertainty of the estimate rises, our interpretation will mostly focus on tables with
six ore five players.
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6.2 Interpretation
Figure 4: 2009 - Reaction Towards Pressure
The percentage of players reaching the flop for a certain level of pressure can also
be seen as the percentage of the in average strongest cards which are considered to
be good enough to face the ones with which was raised. All 169 card combinations
are about equally likely to be dealt, thus if for example 60% of players do not fold
facing a certain amount of pressure, they have to play using the best 60% of card
combinations. If less people fold inevitably worse cards have to be played.
The pressure is considered as an indicator of the strength of the hand and results
will be interpreted accordingly.
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Figure 5: 2015 - Reaction Towards Pressure
Expectations:
As mentioned in the introduction of this chapter and as literature suggests, we
can expect players’ hands to improve with the amount they choose to raise. Conse-
quently, the number of cards good enough to call bigger raises should decline.
However, it is not clear to what extent the number of players folding rises with
increasing pressure. According to neurological research (c.f.[9]) people tend to have
rather a logarithmic understanding of numbers than a linear one. This would sug-
gest that the influence of an increase of one big blind in pressure depends on the
overall pressure and declines with rising pressure. Hence the difference between a
player who is raised three compared to four big blinds could be higher than the
difference between 13 and 14 big blinds.
There are also some really strong hands which most poker players in principal do
not fold with. These about 3-5% of cards will most likely never be thrown away, no
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matter what pressure is applied. Thus, we can expect the rate of players reaching
the flop under pressure never to be below 5%.
But still, from a rational, logical point of view the number of calls and raises should
decline with increasing pressure.
Results:
We will first compare and interpret both figures together and afterwards focus on
the differences between the years.
The results illustrated in figure 4 and 5 suggest an entirely different approach of
players’ reaction towards pressure.
Even though the linear approximation of the influence declines with rising pressure
as expected, the spline function is not following a linear trend at all. All in all, fewer
people reach the flop if the pressure is increased, as the linear regression line over
the entire data shows. But according to the spline function for some segments the
number of players reaching the flop is not declining with rising pressure.
The most interesting information is provided within the local gradient of the smooth-
ing function. Even if the number of players reaching the flop overall declines with
increasing pressure, it locally rises in few occasions. In other words: The probability
to reach the flop does not always decrease with an increase of pressure. Especially
if you look at the points between the pressure of five to eight big blinds, we can
examine this phenomenon in both years and throughout all numbers of players at a
table.
From a strategic point of view this means if all players act rational, that cards of
an opponent who raised seven big blinds are evaluated to be weaker over all obser-
vations than the cards of someone raising five big blinds.
It has to be mentioned that this only holds if players base their decision on the
strength of the opponent’s hands. The strength of the own hand is considered, as
concluded before, if more players stay in the game they have to do so with on aver-
age weaker hands.
This is a very interesting phenomenon, because it does not seem logical that poker
players can maximise their profits with this behaviour.
It is unexpected, and possibly hints towards irrational behaviour.
But altogether, fewer people reach the flop if the pressure is increased as the linear
regression line shows over the data.
We can conclude that at a certain point, an increase of pressure apparently evokes
the pressurized player to consider the strength of the opponent’s hand to be weaker.
In the next subsection, we will develop explanation approaches of several kinds and




There are three different explanatory approaches provided within this thesis to ex-
plain why in some segments of figure 4 and 5 an increase of pressure does not reduce
the number of players reaching the flop. All of which do not explain the results
completely but will deliver ways to understand the reasons for players’ behaviour to
some extent.
A socio-economic, a psychological and a strategic explanation approach will be ex-
amined.
The first explanatory approach deals with irrational behaviour of poker players and
possible reasons for misconduct in online poker.
Within his book ”Thinking, Fast and Slow” (c.f[17]) the socio-economist Daniel
Kahnemann elaborates a theory, according to which intuitive decisions differ from
”slow”, well thought out ones due to their completely different decision making pro-
cess. According to him intuitive decisions are a lot more bias and mistake prone
and often lead to bad judgement and bad evaluation of situations within decisions.
Further, according to Kahnemann most people do not take the trouble to sufficiently
think through decisions. Additionally, involvement of emotions favour irrational de-
cisions.
As mentioned, the reaction under pressure is nearly always an intuitive decision.
Most online poker sites only give a window of 30 seconds to make up ones mind
about the next decision. Thus, it seems natural that some players take bad deci-
sions in the realm of intuition.
Furthermore, according to [21] there are gambling addicts involved in online poker.
Those players tend to seek the thrill of gambling and thus are more likely to react
irrationally under pressure (c.f.[4]). There is a major tendency towards unrealistic
reactions under pressure in online poker for gambling addicts, which could explain
that some people rather stay in the game under higher pressure, making the game
more exciting. Aditionally, gambling addicts are more prone to fall for wrong deci-
sions if they are taken intuitively (c.f.[17]).
According to [21], loosing control over the decision taking process because of emo-
tions, so called tilting, is common amongst online poker players. This topic has been
researched during the past years and delivered results, pointing out irrational be-
haviour of online poker players. (Quite funny that the biggest online poker website
is called Full Tilt Poker)
Overall, tilting is suggesting that players in online poker who act irrationally are
less likely to fold when being put under more pressure. Research confirmed that a
lot of poker players indeed act irrationaly (c.f.[19]).
As mentioned, this is only one aspect, but provides a possible reason for the results
observed. Obviously, not all poker players react irrationally when being pressurized
and the results of chart 4 and 5 do not automatically imply irrational behaviour
but it has to be pointed out that some players might act irrationally, due to reasons
explained within behavioural and socio-economics.
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The second explanatory approach focuses on the psychological aspects of being put
under pressure and the psychological aspect of the game itself. This paragraph will
examine parallels of the pre-flop decision taking process with the so called ultima-
tum game.
There are numerous sociological experiments stressing how people tend to act irra-
tionally concerning their own pay-off if feeling pressurized.
A good example is the ultimatum game in which players tend to accept losses for
themselves in order not to let the other player get away with pressurizing them
(c.f.[20]).
In this game player 1 divides a given amount of money provided by a third party
into two parts. Afterwards, the other player has to choose between two possibilities:
Either he can take the money offered to him by the first player, or he could reject
the money and neither player gets anything at all. From a rational point of view,
the second player has to accept any amount of money offered as long as it exceeds
zero, to maximize profit.
Let us now examine a situation in which player 1 offers less than a third of the total
amount of money, thus is pressuring the other player to take the deal.
Results show that most of the time player 2 is not willing to accept this offer (c.f.[20]).
There are several reasons for this, one of which emphasises that people generally do
not want to give in when pressurized.
This psychological phenomenon can be seen in a huge variety of games and real life
situations, and even to some extent in online poker (c.f.[21]). Hence, provides yet
another reason to explain the results of figures 4 and 5.
We can conclude that players tend to react controversial under pressure. Sometimes
even do not act profit maximizing on purpose the only reason being not to give in
when pressurized. Psychologically speaking as shown in [28], people do not like to
give in when pressurized. The subconsciousness resents the thought of being con-
trolled by another person by the means of pressure and thus feels the urge to oppose
it (c.f.[28]). This reaction is caused subconsciously and a by a feeling, hence we can
not directly conclude to what extent decisions are based on this phenomenon. But
it seems natural that it influences the process of taking a decision when pressured
even in the online poker pre-flop game.
If players feel more pressurized by a raise of eight than five big blinds and thus want
to oppose the opponents higher pressure, they might be less likely to proceed in the
game when being raised five big blinds instead of eight. This hypothesis insinuates
irrational behaviour.
One further aspect not insinuating irrational behaviour is provided by strategic
implications of the game. People normally raise, as suggested by poker literatur
one to five big blinds the first round of betting (which affects 76% of our data
examined)(c.f.[1]).
If a player exceeds this amount it attracts attention and reactions are more likely to
be thought through more exceedingly than the more common, one to five big blind
raise. It is not considered to be normal to raise more than five big blinds the first
round of betting pre-flop. Hence, players could wonder what the reason for such a
high raise might be.
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If they conclude it is not due to the strength of the hand but because of strategic
aspects, calling or re-raising seems to be the right thing to do.
This raises the question whether starting hands which raises over five big blinds
are made with, are better or worse than the other ones.
As mentioned before it is not easy to determine the exact strength of the start-
ing hand. But poker literature mostly agrees on the top 20 of the best pocket cards
(c.f.[13],[1]). To provide a possible answer to this question, we will examine how
many percent of the hands, which was raised a certain amount of big blinds with,
are amongst these top 20 hands. Thus, the probability for a player who is staying
in the game to face a really strong hand for a certain segment of pressure.
We will conduct this analysis with the entire dataset, hence regardless of the year
or the number of players at each table.
Further, there are only about 5% of pocket cards available within the data, as cards
usually are only shown when a player reaches the show down. This implies that
nearly all cards shown were not folded during one of the pre and post flop betting
rounds and thus are likely to be stronger than the average starting hand.
Afterwards, we divide the dataset into two subsets, one in which players choose to
raise 4 or 5 big blinds with their starting hands and the other in which they raised
6, 7 or 8 big blinds. As previously examined more players fold if being raised the
lower amount of blinds for these two subsets in both years.
Results show, that about 50.7% of the pocket cards which were raises four or five
big blinds were amongst the really strong top 20 pocket cards. While 67.2% of the
ones that had been raised between six and eight big blinds were one of these top
combinations.
This shows that the pocket cards which the higher amount of big blinds was raised
with can be considered to be stronger. Thus, reactions towards higher raises should
be considered with care, as playing against one of these top 20 starting hands is
only advisable if one holds a very good one as well.
This implies that from a rational point of view less people should try to reach the
flop when being raised six to eight instead of four to five big blinds over all the data
examined. This suggests irrational behaviour within both years, because folding was
less likely facing the higher raises in both charts.
Thus, we can conclude that there has to be irrational behaviour to some extent.
This is not a rule which applies for all individual cases but provides a broad conclu-
sion over all hands played. Even though higher pre-flop first round raises might be
connected to bluffs, the overall chance of facing a really strong hand is higher than
when facing a smaller raise. After all, we can not conclude irrational behaviour for
individual cases, but can see misconduct over all the hands examined.
Now let us examine the influence of the second and third round of betting. These
rounds can not be analysed like the first round as all players involved already con-
tributed money to the pot, thus have a higher incentive to stay in the game.
Consequently, players who enter a second or even third round of betting are way
24
more likely to reach the flop. The reaction towards raises in these rounds of betting
depend on the amount of previously committed money to a great extent, thus we
can not draw conclusions the same way as for the first round. If a player has already
bet money the first round he signals a strong hand and could continue in the game
even if his chances to win are not better than the opponent’s, as he looses money if
he folds immediately.
We can not observe any tendency within the data for players facing pressure above
25 big blinds. Due to reasons provided above, no player is likely to fold holding one
of the top 10 or 20 hands and raises of 25 big blinds and above are usually only
called with very good pocket cards. Thus, there is not that much of a difference
between raises of 25 big blinds and those above.
One different aspect is the so called committing to the pot. This arises if a player
puts enough money into the pot to make a later fold very expensive or even irra-
tional. This does not occur if a player calls five to eight big blinds, but it does if they
post 25 or more big blinds in the pot the first round. If raised a big amount of blinds
players feel they have to commit to the hand entirely if they stay in the game and
thus only choose very strong hands to do so. Consequently, the difference between a
raise of 25 big blinds or one above is not that high. Additionally, a decision facing a
raise of 25 big blinds or above is influenced by the risk attitude of the player (c.f.[10]).
Furthermore, there is only few data observed with players under the pressure above
25 big blinds. Thus, the variance plays a bigger role.
After all, it seems natural that the pressure caused by a raise of 25 big blinds is
already the maximal amount possible, as it attacks a substantial amount of money
from the opponent and most of the time leads to all-in pushes.
6.4 Difference between the Years
Now let us compare the reaction towards pressure in the two different years.
All in all, the general course of the smoothing and linear approximations is quite
similar for both years. As mentioned in the introduction of this paragraph we will
only focus on the results concerning tables with five or six players.
First looking at the linear approximation of the influence of the pressure provided
within the linear regression line, we can see the line declining faster in 2015 than
in 2009. Thus, the overall influence of pressure computed over all the data is more
severe in 2015. This shows that over all the data observed players in 2015 fear higher
raises more than players in 2009 do. It further suggests improvement of strategy
over the years, because the overall pressure has a higher influence in 2015.
Observing the pressure of five to eight big blinds in either year, we can see a higher
increase of players reaching the flop of the data in 2015 than in 2009.
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This, as concluded in the previous paragraph, is rather a sign for irrational be-
haviour and suggests flaws within strategic aspects of the game.
One of the possible reason for this is provided within the results of chapter 4, in
which we established that people in 2015 play more aggressively and are more likely
to bluff and raise with on average weaker hands. As a consequence, individual as-
sessment of opponents’ behaviour becomes more important in the year 2015, which
could lead to more people not trusting raises above five big blinds.
There is one further difference concerning raises above 15 big blinds. While the
ratio of people reaching the flop for raises above 15 big blinds is almost steady in
2009, it varies a bit in 2015. This might again be caused by the higher amount of
players bluffing in 2015 causing a higher variance.
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7 Conclusion
This thesis has shown how the online pre-flop poker game has changed over the years.
First, we selected the data which the analysis was conducted with. We chose data
from the years 2009 and 2015 subdivided into the two blind levels NL100 and NL200
with about 7.5 Million observations each.
Further, we established the pre-flop options and how frequently each decision and
decision-combination was chosen in either year.
Results suggested a more aggressive style of strategy in the year of 2015, which is
advised within poker literature.
Then, we focused on the influence of the categorical variables size of the blind,
number of players at each table, position and their interactions with the year the
game was played in on the probability for a player to reach the flop.
Results showed severe differences between the years for nearly all variables but due
to mixed results an improvement of strategy over the years could not be concluded
beyond any doubt.
Afterwards we examined the influence of pressure on the probability to reach the
flop for both years.
Results gave reason to question the behaviour of players under low pressure com-
pared to intermediate pressure.
The paragraph provided explanatory approaches of strategic, behaviour-economical
and of psychological nature, all of which made players’ behaviour comprehensible to
some extent. Especially psychological aspects provide reasons for flaws within the
decision taking process. Overall, pressure has more influence on the probability to
reach the flop in 2015 but the difference between the reaction to small and interme-
diate pressure are more severe. Thus, we can only conclude some improvement of
strategy over the years.
All in all, the pre-flop online poker game has changed severely over the years, while
an improvement of poker strategy can not be concluded beyond any doubt. The re-
action towards pressure in online poker suggests irrational behaviour to some extent
due to psychological reasons.
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